July Update: |
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Within the current context, how significant can it be (if at all) that the World Cup Winner is a 100% home-based team? And, on the other hand, a team defending the colors of a country that stands out as one of the largest importers of players and soccer stars from other nations? (See above tables.) |
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July Update: |
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Regarding this issue, in the aftermath of Brazil's disappointing lackluster performances and early exit from this World Cup (2006), news from Brazil account that a Congressman intends to propose a law which, if approved, would make it illegal for the Brazilian Squad to call a player who is based abroad. Should this Congressman's intent manage to succeed its way into law, and should it then happen that the Brazilian Squad still insisted on making use of one or more foreign-based players, then the Brazilian Soccer Federation would be faced with a high fine penalty for every foreign-based player that were nominated for the team. The fine money, in turn, would be donated to amateur and youth soccer (or perhaps amateur and youth sports, in general).
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Reportedly, the motivation for proposing such a law was derived from a general feeling that the Brazilian constellation representing the country's football at the World Cup in Germany (comprising 20 players based abroad) failed to connect with the people back home, having rather been a neutral representative of their own international stardom status, than a committed representative of the Brazilian soul and flame. It was also mentioned, in this connection, that another mistake had been the Squad's having first met already in Switzerland (then thought as a convenient location to start World Cup preparation, given that most players were living in Europe), and not in Brazil, where the players would have enjoyed some healthy contact with the people on the streets, as well as the World Cup atmosphere building up in the country. |
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In sum, it appears that Brazilians back home have been having a hard time coming to terms with the apathetic way in which their star-packed team was felt to have played in Germany. Whether or not the law project at stake can actually survive all standard procedures, especially in a year dominated by approaching presidential elections, it remains to be seen. But the fact that such a proposal was actually put forth by a local congressman emerges as an interesting–if not relevant–additional point, amid the overall context emerging on this and the next pages. |
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Related to the same context, though on a different note, were comments made by Oleg Blokhin, shortly before the World Cup kick-off. Blokhin reportedly expressed frustration, then, at the ever increasing number of foreign players in Ukrainian clubs. His words, as cited, simply aimed at remarking that this fact had made his job all the more difficult, on two accounts: [1] it obviously decreased the potential number of local players that he could see in action, at Ukrainian clubs playing their local championships, with a view to nominating players for the squad to be taken to Germany; [2] at the same time, the presence of so many non-Ukrainian players in Ukrainian clubs had additionally started representing an unexpected hindrance to the development of young Ukrainian players.
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The argument reported, in this connection (i.e., [2], above), was that it was apparently being felt a better an easier investment for the clubs to spend money on already renowned players coming from outside Ukraine, who could provide immediate investment return, than to spend in the lengthy and always uncertain development process of local youngsters, only a few of whom would eventually grow into international class players, such as Shevchenko. |
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While it could always be possible to suspect a certain degree of prejudice in Oleg Blokhin's reported remarks, they may merely be expressive of the status quo he has observed in the Ukraine scenario, and be thus entirely deprived of whatever destructive or prejudiced criticism that one could otherwise choose to read in Blokhin's expression of frustration as Ukraine's national squad's coach. A look at the tables in the current eBook section may suggest that a similar phenomenon could be taking place in a number of other places. However, the recency of this situation alluded to in Blokhin's reported comments, possibly best embodied in the modern marketing-minded club-enterprise paradigm–Real Madrid, Manchester United, Liverpool, among other clubs, for example–does not yet allow a real understanding of its consequences in the World of Football. |
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Among these, one seems easily clear: it is not the number of renowned stars that makes a team a winner. Or else Real Madrid would not have found themselves starved of titles as it has been of late. In this context, see Carlos Alberto Parreira's quote–in fact quite ironic, in view of what he managed to get the Brazilian team to deliver in Germany-2006!...
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There always being a silver lining, no matter the size of the cloud, the bright side of the issues at stake–undoubtedly all resurfaced amid the context of the 2006 World Cup (in special by such facts as Italy's victory vs. Brazil's lackluster performances, among others)–could perhaps be illustrated in the Australian team: The experience that their players were able to acquire, by taking part in the English championships, in special, may have been an invaluable asset for Guus Hidding's valiant squad. Like Ghana, another impressive debutant (such as also Ukraine, though their side carrying an inherited lineage of experience for having always played a major dorsal spine role in the former Soviet Squads–see related notes), the Australian side made it past the Round of Sixteen, whereas theoretically stronger teams, such as the Czech Republic, went home in disappointment, despite ranking second at FIFA. The Australian boys, it should be added, came very close to eliminating an exhausted 10-maned Italy, the 2006 Champion (!), in their Round of Sixteen match! (See a brief reminder of these circumstances.)
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So, a priori, it seems that rather than regretting the 'globalization' status quo now verifiable also in the soccer scenario, or rather than attempting at legislating in order to ensure the emotional readiness of one's players to join the National Squad, etc., what may most urgently be needed is a 'cultural update,' so to speak, an update of the mental paradigm underlying the decisions and actions of those involved in the sport, starting with those in managerial positions, from club presidents and directors to coaches and trainers. |
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Also, a priori, it looks like the Squads that were best 'updated' to dealing within the context of this new 'globalized' soccer context were the ones that managed the best relative degree of success–such as above-mentioned Australia and Ghana, especially, among a few other pleasant surprises. It is curious that Carlos Alberto Parreira, known as an intellectual, would have missed the need for the above-mentioned 'update,' so he could have put to good use all his accumulated experience.
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Given that the status quo revealed on this page and the following is most likely here to stay, accompanying the very tendency of the World and society which we are part of, the best one can now is to look around and ahead, analyze, and update one's own methods and ideas, in addition to seeking for the silver linings and learning how to make the most of these. |
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For, as the old Chinese saying goes, don't curse darkness, light a candle! Or, as Brazilians analogously say, if what you get from God are lemons, then make lemonade! |
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By the 2010 World Cup, in South Africa, there should be clearer insight regarding both the ongoing scenario changes toward globalization in the soccer context, as well as regarding how successfully or not these changes are being dealt with, within the smaller contexts of the different Squads qualifying for the coming World Cup. |
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And given FIFA's humanistic oriented concerns (emergent in a number of details related to the 2006 World Cup–more than in any previous World Cup), now, in this four-year interval up to South Africa-2010, FIFA could both profit and benefit their affiliated Soccer Federations, should there be an interest also in promoting research and study groups seeking to understand and best cope with the issues appearing on the current and following pages. Surely time would be well spent in lighting the needed candles, finding the related silver linings, and figuring out how to make the most delicious lemonades, along these four years preceding the South African World Cup. After all, if sponsorship contracts have already been signed for 2010, why not? As the current (2006) World Cup has indicated, the difference between success and failure may lie, in many cases, precisely in this domain. |